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Companies finance their assets by using mix of debt and equity. Firms with relatively 
more extensive use of debt choice are said to be financially more leveraged. The firms with 
relatively more extensive use of interest bearing long term debt relative to equity choice are 
said to be financially more geared. Choice of long term interest bearing debt and equity has 
serious implications for the value of the firm as a whole and all stakeholders.  
Significant variation in gearing ratio exists at aggregate level, across various 
sectors, firms and over time. We notice substantial variation in overall corporate gearing 
(GR) and debt-equity ratio (DER) of corporate sector from 2000 to 2009 (Figures 1 and 
2). Interestingly overall economic conditions and equity market has also seen visible 
changes during the fore-mentioned periods (Figure 3). This implies that, in view of 
changing economic conditions, most of the firms or sectors placed great deal on their 
capital structure decisions. Real interest rate remained very low over this period and even 
negative in some years from 2005 to 2009 (Figure 3). Extremely low interest rates gave a 
boost to financial leverage (gearing ratio) to its peak in 2005 followed by sharp rise in 
non-performing loans starting from 2007 onwards (Figure 5) which now is likely to pose 
a big challenge for financial sector and push economy into another crisis. 
Gearing ratio of the textile sector has shown its peak level during 2005 due to 
negative real rate interest followed by an explosion in its financing costs which along 
with removal of textile quota and acute energy crisis later on hampered their profitability 
(Figure 4) and ability to repay its debt.  Quarterly Performance Review of the Banking 
System (December 2010) reports loans of Rs 705.2 billion of textile sector alone by the 
end of 2009 out of which non-performing loan is Rs 171.5 billion which constitutes  31.3 
percent of the total non-performing loans. This motivates us to explore various aspects of 
gearing ratio of the firms of textile industry in Pakistan.  
All studies on capital structure of Pakistani firms in past have focused on only 
firm-specific determinants of financial leverage and completely ignored the impact of 
macroeconomic and institutional changes. This study explores whether these changes in 
corporate gearing are a consequence of macroeconomic and institutional changes or 
changes in firm specific factors?  
 
Ijaz Hussain <ijazhussain786@yahoo.com> is Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, 
Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.  
Author’s Note:  Author is in particular thankful to Dr Hafiz A. Pasha, Dean, School of Social Sciences, 
Beaconhouse National University, Lahore for his valuable guidance and advice. 
700 Ijaz Hussain 
 
Fig. 1.  Debt-Equity Ratio (%) 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Gearing Ratio (%) 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Selected Macroeconomic/Institutional Indicators and Corporate Gearing 
 
Source: Balance Sheet Analysis of Non-Financial Companies Listed in Karachi Stock exchange of Pakistan 
(Various Issues) Hand Book on Statistics of Pakistan (2010), State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Fig. 4. Profitability vs. Financing Costs of Textile Sector 
 
Source: Balance Sheet Analysis of Non-Financial Companies Listed in Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan 
(Various Issues). 
 
Fig. 5.  Ratio of NPLs to Total Loans (All Banks) 
 
Source: Financial Soundness Indicators (June, 2011), Banking Surveillance Department, State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section I reviews literature. Section II 
identifies data sources, variables and methodology. Section III presents findings and 
Section IV presents conclusion and gives policy recommendations.  
 
I.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debate of debt-equity choice is well documented in literature. Literature 
provides a range of theories (including MM theory, trade-off theory, signaling theory, 
pecking order theory and agency theory), academic researches and empirical evidence to 
address this issue. Capital structure debate started with the seminal paper of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). They prove in this paper that under some restrictions (perfect market, 
absence of taxes, bankruptcy or financial distress costs), value of the firm is independent 
of the choice of debt or equity. This controversial proposition led to an unending debate 
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A vast range of literature debates on the consequences of relaxing the assumptions 
of MM theory. This literature can be classified into two groups namely trade-off (target 
leverage) models and the models of signalling and pecking order (financing hierarchies) 
[Shuetrim, et al. (1993)]. Trade-off Target leverage models introduce debt tax shield, 
bankruptcy risk, financial distress costs and agency costs to MM theory while models of 
signalling and pecking order introduce information asymmetry, transaction costs, dilution 
of ownership and fund liquidity constraints [Shuetrim, et al. (1993)]. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) received severe criticism to their controversial 
proposition. Modigliani and Miller (1963) extended their work by introducing corporate 
taxes in their model. This work suggests that deductibility of interest expense associated 
with debt reduces taxable income and tax liability. Therefore, choice of debt in capital 
structure provides tax shield (advantage) and motivates firms to rely entirely on debt. But 
firms, in practice, are never completely debt financed rather they use mix of debt and 
equity.  Miller (1977) introduced the personal taxes on dividend income of shareholders and 
interest income of creditors in addition to corporate taxes and proved that incentive to use 
hundred percent debt fades away under various tax regimes. If earnings before interest and 
tax are low or negative, debt tax shield is low or completely disappears. This indicates that 
tax shield gains associated debt will diminish [Deangelo and Masulis (1980)]. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963) and Miller (1977) completely ignored 
bankruptcy or default risk. As discussed in Shuetrim, et al. (1993), bankruptcy or likely 
default with increasing debt burdens involves some direct and indirect costs. Direct costs 
include liquidation fees, legal charges and trustees’ fees in case of default while indirect 
costs include losses of sales, purchase, market share, creditors and suppliers due to 
disruption by creditors either in case of default or likely default [Shuetrim, et al. (1993)]. 
This also suggests inverse relation between risk or financial distress costs and gearing. 
Fixed component of financial distress costs constitutes a significant fraction of the value 
of smaller firms [Ang, et al. (1982)]. This signifies a positive relation between size and 
financial leverage. However, bigger firms may have less chances and low costs of 
bankruptcy through diversification [Graham, et al. (1998) and Gaud, et al. (2005)] and 
stable cash flows [Rajan and Zingales (1995)] suggesting a positive relation between debt 
and size.  Default risk can be reduced through guarantees by the firms in the form of 
collateral. This implies positive relation between collateral and debt burden [Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993); Chaplinksy and Neihaus (1990); Bradely, et al. (1984)]. Relatively 
higher financial distress costs for larger firms depress financial leverage [Marsh (1982); 
Titman and Wessels (1988); Ooi (1999); Chen (2003)] but if the larger firms diversify 
and are able to reduce their bankruptcy costs then trade-off theory predicts a positive sign 
between size and gearing ratio. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) accept agency costs arising from asymmetry between 
expected returns on investments by creditors and stockholders. Creditors are entitled to 
fixed interest payments while shareholders have limited liability and claims on residual 
earnings. Therefore, corporate managers, being agents to shareholders, may undertake 
risky investments to appropriate funds from creditors because higher gains from risky 
investments will accrue more to shareholders relative to those of creditors. Creditors react 
by tightening credit terms i.e., they demand high interest rate and higher value of 
collateral as a real guarantee. Lowe and Rohling (1993) also point out conflict of interest 
between corporate managers and shareholders. Bankruptcy on account of excessive use 
 Growth and Financing Behaviour of Firms of Textile Industry 703 
 
of debt puts jobs and reputation of the corporate managers at stake. Therefore, they feel 
reluctant to use excessive debt even for projects with positive net present value. But this 
type of agency cost is manageable through use of equity. Jensen (1986) points out 
another type of agency cost. In his view, corporate managers of larger firms with surplus 
cash flows may tend to invest in unprofitable projects because their remuneration 
depends on size of the firm. Moreover, higher debt will reduce this type of agency cost.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) note that there exists an information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and investors and they also accept that being insiders corporate 
managers are relatively better informed about the actual worth of the firm and its equity.  
This asymmetric information argument led to the development of the signalling theory. If 
corporate managers choose debt as first choice of financing they signal to the market that 
firm expects stable cash flows in future. Pecking order theory suggests that if corporate 
managers choose equity as a first choice they send a signal to market to highlight that its 
equity is currently overvalued. This gives rise to negative stock price reaction from 
investors. Therefore, in order to avoid such negative price reaction, firms prioritise their 
financing choices from internal funds as first choice to debt and leaving equity as a 
financing means of last resort [Myers (1984)].  Such hierarchy of finances is known as 
pecking order theory in literature.  
Capital structure of the firms of developed countries with similar institutional 
structures has been the subject of most of the researches [Teker, et al. (2009); Chen 
(2003)]. However, a very few studies focus on the firms from emerging market with 
institutional differences [Sayilgan, et al. (2006)].  
Pakistani firms’ financial leverage has also received very limited attention. To my 
knowledge, debate on determinants of financial leverage or capital structure of Pakistani 
firms started with the work of Shah and Hijazi (2004) followed by Tariq and Hijazi 
(2006), Shah and Khan (2007) and Rafiq, et al. (2008).  
Most of these studies including those a very few on capital structure of Pakistani 
firms focus on understanding the firm specific determinants of financial leverage and 
completely ignore macroeconomic or institutional factors likely to influence capital 
structure decisions of the firms. To my knowledge, Shuetrim, et al. (1993) is the only 
study that includes asset prices, inflation, potential debt tax shield and fund cost 
differential in addition to the firm specific determinants of capital structure of Australian 
firms and identifies that macroeconomic variables also influence financial leverage.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by introducing macroeconomic or 
institutional factors in addition to firm specific determinants of corporate financial 
leverage of the firms in textile industry in Pakistan. 
 
II.  DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Set 
This paper uses secondary data from “Balance Sheet Analysis (2000–2009) of 
Joint Stock Companies Listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange published by Statistics 
Department of State Bank of Pakistan.” The sample of this study covers all 75 firms of 
textile industry with complete and consistent 10 years data series. This paper excludes the 
firms with incomplete and inconsistent data series. The firms with negative equity are 
also excluded. 
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Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable for this study is financial leverage. Several measures of 
financial leverage including total debt divided by total assets [Rajan and Zingale (1995)], 
debt equity ratios based on book value or market values [Allen and Mizuno (1989); 
Gaud, et al. (2005); Ooi (1999)] exist in literature. Since this study intends to explore 
determinants of choice of long term debt and equity, therefore, this study uses gearing 
ratio i.e., long term debt divided by total assets as a proxy measure for financial leverage.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
Following Shuetrim, et al. (1993), identify two categories of explanatory 
variables:  
(1) Firm specific variables including Profitability, efficiency, size, growth, 
collateral and risk.   
(2) Macroeconomic or institutional variables including overall macroeconomic 
environment, equity market environment, potential debt tax shield, and real 
cost of debt (implicitly inflation). 
 
Firm Specific Determinants of Corporate Financial Leverage: 
    Profitability (NPM) and Efficiency (ATO) 
Trade-off theory predicts that in view of high tax burden and low risk, profitable 
and efficient firms take high debt burdens. [Sayilgan, et al. (2006)]. As noted in Gaud,   
et al. (2005), past profitability predicts future profitability; therefore, in view of 
confidence in repaying their debt, profitable firms employ more debt. Consistent with the 
view of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) in pecking order theory, profitable 
and efficient firms prefer to use internal funds, therefore, employ less debt. Results of 
Gaud, et al. (2005), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Donaldson (1961), Chen (2003), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Ozkan (2001) are consistent with pecking order theory. 
This paper uses Return on Assets as a proxy for profitability and efficiency. Return 
on Assets (ROA) is a composite measure for profitability and efficiency. ROA indicates 
degree of effective use of assets of the firm to generate profits.  
            
                    
         
 * 
         
            
 
Where Net Profit Margin (NPM) is the measure of profitability and Asset Turn 
Over (ATO) is the measure of efficiency i.e. effective use of assets to generate sales.  
 
Size (TA) 
Larger firms have relatively better access to credit market [Ferri and Jones (1979); 
Wiwattanakantang (1999)], favourable credit terms and stable cash flows [Graham (2000); 
Gaud, et al. (2005)] to repay their debt. Therefore, trade-off theory predicts positive relation 
between size and gearing. Relatively higher financial distress costs for larger firms depress 
financial leverage [Marsh (1982); Titman and Wessels (1988); Ooi (1992); Chen (2003)] but 
if the larger firms diversify and are able to reduce their bankruptcy costs then Trade-off theory 
predicts a positive sign between size and gearing ratio. Relatively better access to equity 
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market motivates firms to rely on equity rather than debt [Chen (2003)]. Bigger firms have 
sufficient internal funds; therefore, Signalling and Pecking order theory also predicts a 
negative sign. This study uses total assets (TA) as a proxy variable for size. 
 
Growth (LOG(GS)) 
Growing firms require more funds for their expansion. If firms deplete their 
internal funds during the growth process, the firms would prefer debt to equity. 
Therefore, signalling and pecking order theory suggests a positive impact of growth on 
corporate gearing [Drobetz and Fix (2003)]. If growing firms have limited access to 
equity market, they would tend to rely on debt choice for funding their growth process. 
This would be true for the countries where equity markets are underdeveloped. Growing 
firms are likely to be more liberal in their investments in risky projects, therefore, 
creating high agency costs for the bondholders. This will raise costs of debt for growing 
firms. Therefore, growing firms choose less debt.   Therefore, trade-off theory suggests 
that corporate gearing is negatively related with growth. Results of Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Barclay, et al. (1995) are consistent with this 
view. This paper uses logarithm of gross sales (LOG(GS)) to measure firms’ growth. 
 
Collateral (PFA) 
Larger value of collateral of a firm provides better access to credit market and 
favourable credit terms [Rafiq, et al. (2008); Shah and Khan (2007); Padron, et al. 
(2005); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Teker, Tasseven, and Tukel (2009)] therefore, trade 
off theory predicts a positive sign. In consistent with most of the studies, this paper uses 
proportion of tangible fixed assets (PFA) in total assets as an indicator for collateral. 
 
Risk (EV) 
Earning volatility whether on account of operational failure or inefficient 
management is considered as proxy for risk in literature.  This study uses squared 
deviation of return on assets (EV) from mean as a measure of risk because this reflects 
earning volatility on account of both operational failure and management inefficiency. 
Riskier firms with high risk of default and high bankruptcy costs [Padron, et al. 
(2005)] face poor access to credit market and also poor terms of credit. This discourages 
firms to choose debt financing. Therefore, trade off theory predicts negative relations of 
risk and debt financing. Riskier firms already faced with volatile earnings, low equity 
prices and in view of negative stock price reactions from market these firms will not use 
the choice of floating more equity. Thus signalling and pecking order theory predicts a 
positive relation between risk and debt financing.  Faced with poor access to credit 
market, ultimately firms will have to rely on the choice of equity.  
 
Macroeconomic Determinants of Corporate Financial Leverage: 
   Overall Macroeconomic Environment (GDPG)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Overall macroeconomic environment is also likely to affect gearing. We expect a 
positive relation between overall macroeconomic environment and gearing because 
corporate managers with positive expectations plan to enhance their production capacities 
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by increasing their investment in tangible fixed assets for which they need internal or 
external financing. Therefore, positive expectations provide ground for debt financing 
[Sayilgan, Haraback, and Küçükkocaoğlu (2006)]. This paper uses growth rate of GDP 
(GDPG) as a proxy for overall macroeconomic environment. 
 
Equity Market Environment (SPI)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
We take first difference of Karachi general index (SPI) for stock prices as a proxy 
variable for equity market environment. Improvement in equity market environment 
provides better opportunities for issuing equity. We expect negative relation between 
gearing and equity market environment. 
 
Cost of Debt 
Nominal rate of interest is cost of using debt which is sum of real cost of debt and 
rate of inflation. Higher cost of debt discourages use of debt while higher rate of inflation 
encourages financial leverage. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between rate of 
interest and corporate gearing.  
Table 1 below presents the proxies for dependent and explanatory variables: 
 
Table 1 
List, Definitions and Symbols of Proxy Variables 
 Variable Definition and Symbol 
Dependent Variable 
1.  Corporate Gearing 
GR: Gearing Ratio=book value of long term liabilities divided by book 





ROA: Return on Assets=Net Profit Margin x Asset Turn Over 
=Net profit after tax divided by net sales x Sales divided by Total Assets 
3.  Growth LOG(GS); Logarithm of Gross Sales=Logarithm of gross sales 
4.  Size TA: Book value of Total Assets 
5.  Collateral  
PFA: Proportion of Fixed Assets=ratio between book value of fixed and 
total assets 
6.  Risk  
EV=Earnings Volatility=Squared  deviation of Net Profit Margin from 
mean of  10 years Net Profit Margin 









GDPG: GDP Growth Rate 
 
Annexure 1-A shows the summary statistics of the data set. Annexure 2-A shows 
the coefficients of correlation to rule out mutli-colinearity between the regressor 
variables. There is some evidence of co-Linearity between firms’ growth and its size, cost 
of debt and equity market environment, cost of debt and GDP growth. 
General functional form of the model used in this paper is as follows:  
GR =f (ROA, GR(–1), LOG(GS), TA, PFA, EV,  GDPG, D(KGI), I) 
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This study uses highly popular statistical model of panel data analysis that 
combines cross section and time series data and estimates pooled regression of a standard 
model in the following form: 
             +         
Where GR denotes corporate gearing ratio and subscript i specifies cross section 
dimension (firms) and t specifies time dimension of the data set.           and     are 
unknown constants.      represents the set of firm-specific explanatory variables for firms 
which vary across firms as well as over time.     is the set of macroeconomic or 
institutional explanatory variables that vary over time only.        is composite error term 
comprising of firm-specific component   , time-specific component    and a component  
varying over time and across firms    . 
Depending on the structure of the error term and nature of its correlation with 
explanatory variables, there are several ways to estimate our gearing model. Ordinary 
Least Squares is appropriate choice if there exist no unobservable firm- and time-specific 
factors. But in fact, both firm-and time-specific unobservable effects may exist in 
practice.  Choice of random effect model is appropriate when unobservable effects are 
included in error term and variance-covariance matrix of non-spherical errors is 
transformed to have consistent estimates of the standard errors. But random effect 
estimator becomes inconsistent when unobservable effects included in the error term are 
correlated with some or all regressors. Though relatively inefficient, an alternative choice 
is fixed effect model which provides consistent estimates regardless of the fore 
mentioned correlation. 
 
III.  FINDINGS 
First we test the evidence of cross section and period effects and then we 
identify whether they are correlated with the regressors. Our tests show that there is 
strong evidence of period and cross-section random and fixed effects. We use fixed 
effect specification which includes the variables that vary across firms and over time, 
cross-section and period dummy variables. We test joint significance of the cross- 
section and period dummy variables. Our results reveal that both cross-section and 
period fixed effects are significant at 5 percent level (Annexure 3-A). We also estimate 
random effect model and Hausman (1978) test rejects the exogeneity in the random 
effects model and the variance between the coefficients of random and fixed effect 
model is non-zero which restricts us to rely on fixed effect model. Cross-section fixed 
effects are reported in Annexure 4-A. We present results of cross-section fixed effects 
model in Table 2. 
Negative sign with the composite measure of profitability and efficiency
2
 indicates 
that banks fund inefficient and unprofitable firms. This also implies that profitable and 
efficient firms relatively borrow less. Past profits and efficiency predict future 
profitability
3
  therefore  profitable  and  efficient  firms prefer use of internal funds.4  This  
 
2Most of the previous studies use return on asset as measure of profitability though it is composite 
measure of profitability and efficiency.  
3See Gaud, et al. (2005). 
4See Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). 




Dependent Variable: GR 
   Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) 
  Total panel (balanced) observations: 675 
  Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
 White diagonal standard errors and covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C: Constant –2.2507 6.6063 –0.3407 0.7335 
ROA: Profitability and Efficiency –0.1883 0.0603 –3.1220 0.0019 
GR(-1): Lag of Gearing Ratio 0.5266 0.0333 15.8114 0.0000 
TA: Size –0.0002 0.0002 –1.2502 0.2117 
LOG(GS): Firms’ Growth 1.9150 0.9087 2.1074 0.0355 
PFA: Collateral  0.0875 0.0307 2.8473 0.0046 
EV: Risk –0.0001 0.0000 –3.2320 0.0013 
D(KGI): Equity Market Environment –0.0006 0.0003 –2.0847 0.0375 
I: Cost of Debt –0.3504 0.2125 –1.6491 0.0997 
GDPG: Overall Macroeconomic Environment 0.8715 0.2121 4.1095 0.0000 
 
Effects Specification 




  R-squared 0.775247   
Adjusted R-squared 0.743683   
Durbin-Watson stat 1.978962   
 
Un-weighted Statistics 
  R-squared 0.621221 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967496 
 
conforms to signalling and pecking order theory.  This is also consistent with the findings 
of Shah and Hijazi (2004), Tariq and Hijazi (2006), Rafiq, et al. (2008). This contradicts 
the trade-off model which predicts that profitable firms with high tax burden and low 
probability and costs of bankruptcy employ more debt.
5
  
Consistent with pecking order theory, positive sign with growth reflects growing 
firms when deplete their internal funds during growth process ultimately satisfy their 
funds need from debt.
6
  This is consistent with the findings of Rafiq, et al. (2008) and 
Tariq and Khan (2006) and contradicts with those of Shah and Hijazi (2004). Positive 
sign with growth also implies that banks prefer to lend to growing firms because growing 
firms have relatively stable cash flows to repay their debt. If growing firms have limited 
access to equity market, they would tend to rely on debt choice for funding their growth 
process. This would be true for the countries where equity markets are underdeveloped or 
there are legal complications in floating equity. This may also apply in case of Pakistan. 
Sufficient internal funds on account of large scale economies and relatively better 
access to equity market motivates firms to rely on equity rather than debt.
7
  This explains 
the negative sign with size.   
 
5See Sayilgan, et al. (2006). 
6See Shuetrim, Lowe, and Morling (1993); Drobetz and Fix (2003). 
7See Chen (2003). 
 Growth and Financing Behaviour of Firms of Textile Industry 709 
 
Consistent with trade-off model, positive sign with collateral also represents higher 
debt capacity of the firms and better access to credit market by providing real guarantees 
to creditors
8
 and firms will find more willing lenders to supply loans.
9
 This motivates the 
firms to use more long term debt in their capital structure. This is also consistent with the 
findings of Shah and Hijazi (2004), Tariq and Hijazi (2006), Rafiq, et al. (2008). 
Negative sign with risk shows that riskier firms borrow less because corporate 
managers are not confident about repayment of debt due to volatility of operating cash 
flows in particular.  In addition to this, riskier firms have relatively high probability and 
cost of bankruptcy,
10 10
therefore, will have poor access to credit market and face 
unfavourable credit terms which discourage use of debt. Negative sign with risk in our 
finding contradicts the findings in Rafiq, et al. (2008) and Shah and Khan (2007). Rafiq, 
et al. (2008) show positive sign with risk while Shah and Khan (2007) show no impact of 
risk on debt choice and find it highly insignificant. 
Higher interest rates discourage use of debt finance therefore, consistent with the 
trade-off theory, our results show negative sign with cost of det. Overall macroeconomic 
environment points towards future prospects for the firms’ business. Higher GDP growth 
represents relatively better prospects for business which become a basis for positive 
expectations and future expansion plans for corporate managers.   To realise these plans 
firms need initially internal and then external sources of finance if their internal funds are 
depleted. Negative sign with equity market environment indicates that improvement in 
stock market index reflects relatively easy and better access and opportunities for firms to 
raise long term finances by issuing new equity because current situation in equity market 
signals future prospects for investors.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the low reliance of firms on equity finance in Pakistan and low bankruptcy 
costs due to long court procedures, easy credit policy of Shoukat Aziz’s government to 
encourage gearing was quite unwise and inappropriate. High economic growth, extremely 
low nominal interest rate and negative real interest rate gave a boost to financial leverage 
(gearing ratio) of the textile sector to its peak in 2005. Firms are now facing the 
consequence of high gearing. An explosion in their financing costs along with removal of 
textile quota from 2005 onwards and later on acute energy crisis hampered their 
profitability and ability to repay their debt. This in turn contributed to non-performing 
loans which is now likely to pose a big challenge for financial sector and push economy 
into another crisis. 
Therefore, we recommend that debt should be immediately rescheduled to take 
textile sector out of debt trap and energy crisis should be resolved on urgent basis to 
remove operational constraint of the industry. There is also strong need for extensive 
efforts to explore access to foreign markets. 
Findings of this paper prove that all firm specific determinants including 
profitability and efficiency, growth, risk and collateral, excluding size and all 
macroeconomic and institutional variables including overall macroeconomic 
 
8See Padron, et al. (2005). 
9See Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Harris and Raviv (1991). 
10See Lima (2009). 
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environment, equity market environment and cost of debt also significantly influence 
corporate financial leverage of textile industry in Pakistan.  
Negative sign with the composite measure of profitability and efficiency implies 
that banks fund inefficient and unprofitable firms because demand for loans comes from 
inefficient and unprofitable firms. Positive sign with growth and negative sign with risk is 
indicative of the fact that banks prefer to lend to growing firms rather than riskier firms.  
Findings of this paper have serious implications for the firms, banks, investors, 
creditors and policy makers. This model can help the individual firms to identify whether 
their current financial leverage is in line with the benchmark of textile sector.   In view of 
macroeconomic and institutional changes, this paper provides a basis for the firms to 
adjust their financial leverage ratio.  
 
ANNEXURE 
1-A. Summary Statistics 
 GR ROA GR(–1) TA LOG(GS) PFA B D(KGI) I GDPG 
 Mean 32.99 2.03 32.45 2852.96 7.26 54.95 740.03 464.33 10.07 4.92 
 Median 32.60 1.90 31.80 1392.80 7.16 53.80 5.90 1049.71 9.40 4.70 
 Maximum 122.80 77.60 122.80 40277.30 10.08 221.50 415586.50 3050.45 14.30 9.00 
 Minimum 0.00 –187.70 0.00 42.30 1.44 3.90 0.00 –3712.51 7.30 1.70 
 Std. Dev. 21.28 11.37 21.00 4450.24 1.01 22.38 16004.08 1833.08 2.25 2.39 
Observations 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 
 
2-A. Correlation Coefficients 
 GR ROA GR(-1) TA LOG(GS) PFA B D(KGI) I GDPG 
GR 1 –0.1205 0.7283 0.0603 0.2107 0.1312 –0.0389 0.0100 0.0836 0.0956 
ROA –0.1205 1 –0.0735 0.0520 0.1120 –0.0891 –0.6407 0.1087 –0.1708 0.0597 
GR(-1) 0.7283 –0.0735 1 0.0811 0.1893 0.1361 –0.0248 –0.0309 0.1416 0.0301 
TA 0.0603 0.0520 0.0811 1 0.6700 –0.2140 –0.0128 –0.0574 0.2177 0.0195 
LOG(GS) 0.2107 0.1120 0.1893 0.6700 1 –0.3546 –0.0489 –0.0504 0.1845 –0.0028 
PFA 0.1312 –0.0891 0.1361 –0.2140 –0.3546 1 –0.0064 0.0370 0.0234 0.0593 
B –0.0389 –0.6407 –0.0248 –0.0128 –0.0489 –0.0064 1 –0.0056 –0.0461 –0.0297 
D(KGI) 0.0100 0.1087 –0.0309 –0.0574 –0.0504 0.0370 –0.0056 1 –0.5313 0.7372 
I 0.0836 –0.1708 0.1416 0.2177 0.1845 0.0234 –0.0461 –0.5313 1 –0.3787 
GDPG 0.0956 0.0597 0.0301 0.0195 –0.0028 0.0593 –0.0297 0.7372 –0.3787 1 
 
3-A. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Test Cross-section and Period Fixed Effects 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 5.582 –74,661 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 364.077 74 0.0000 
Period F 1.946 –9,661 0.0432 
Period Chi-square 19.611 9 0.0205 
Cross-Section/Period F 5.213 –83,661 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 377.662 83 0.0000 
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4-A. Cross-Section Fixed Effects 
 Firms Effect 
1 Ahmed Hassan Textile Mills Ltd. 6.886 
2 Allawasaya Textile and Finishing Mills Ltd. –5.958441 
3 Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. 6.699526 
4 Artistic Denim Mills Ltd. –7.716303 
5 Aruj Garment Accessories Ltd. –11.30891 
6 Ayesha Textile Mills Ltd. –4.178894 
7 Azam Textile Mills Ltd. –0.88299 
8 Azgard Nine Ltd. (Legler-Nafees Denim Mills Ltd.) 5.592547 
9 Bhanero Textile Mills Ltd. 1.143532 
10 Bilal Fibres Ltd. 4.826812 
11 Blessed Textiles Ltd. 4.003951 
12 Chakwal Spinning Mills Ltd. 9.07585 
13 Colony Mills Ltd. (Colony Textile Mills Ltd.) 10.22614 
14 D.M. Textile Mills Ltd. –3.770705 
15 Dar Es Salaam Textile Mills Ltd. 5.698793 
16 Dawood Lawrencepur Ltd. (Dawood Cotton Mills) –10.03409 
17 Dewan Khalid Textile Mills Ltd. –7.22722 
18 Dewan Mushtaq Textile Mills Ltd. 1.358755 
19 Dewan Textile Mills Ltd. 4.967196 
20 Din Textile Mills Ltd. –3.503656 
21 Ellcot Spinning Mills Ltd. 8.222868 
22 Faisal Spinning Mills Ltd. 3.740499 
23 Fateh Textile Mills Ltd. 5.513969 
24 Fawad Textile Mills Ltd. –2.875707 
25 Fazal Cloth Mills Ltd. 5.04144 
26 Gadoon Textile Mills Ltd. –7.882432 
27 Ghazi Fabrics International Ltd. 7.654191 
28 Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. 3.701456 
29 Gulistan Spinning Mills Ltd. –1.581796 
30 Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. –1.315367 
31 Gulshan Spinning Mills Ltd. –0.118932 
32 Haji Mohammad Ismail Mills Ltd. –6.099639 
33 Husein Industries Ltd. –4.176179 
34 ICC Textiles Ltd. –1.298544 
35 Ideal Spinning Mills Ltd. 10.55645 
36 Idrees Textile Mills Ltd. –3.965902 
37 Indus Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1.084043 
38 Ishaq Textile Mills Ltd. 1.994372 
39 Island Textile Mills Ltd. 3.997519 
40 J.K. Spinning Mills Ltd. –7.265255 
41 Janana De Malucho Textile Mills Ltd –6.02521 
42 Khalid Siraj Textile Mills Ltd. –18.34995 
Continued— 
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A 4—(Continued) 
43 Kohinoor Mills Ltd. 0.821704 
44 Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd. 2.356124 
45 Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. 0.238897 
46 Mahmood Textile Mills Ltd. –5.806772 
47 Maqbool Textile Mills Ltd. 0.009652 
48 Masood Textile Mills Ltd. 7.279389 
49 Mian Textile Industries Ltd. 13.1299 
50 Mohammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd. –4.629541 
51 N.P. Spinning Mills Ltd. –10.03802 
52 Nadeem Textile Mills Ltd. –6.51514 
53 Nakshbandi Industries Ltd. 6.154592 
54 Nina Industries Ltd. 2.552844 
55 Nishat (Chunian) Ltd. 4.816083 
56 Nishat Mills Ltd. –5.153247 
57 Olympia Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 0.208376 
58 Paramount Spinning Mills Ltd. 0.322807 
59 Premium Textile Mills Ltd. 6.603837 
60 Prosperity Weaving Mills Ltd. 9.325779 
61 Quality Textile Mills Ltd. –6.746521 
62 Quetta Textile Mills Ltd. 16.71987 
63 Ravi Textile Mills Ltd. 3.616668 
64 Reliance Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. –8.02911 
65 Reliance Weaving Mills Ltd. 4.651127 
66 Saif Textile Mills Ltd. 6.165284 
67 Sajjad Textile Mills Ltd. –2.215353 
68 Salfi Textile Mills Ltd. –2.943558 
69 Salman Noman Enterprises Ltd. –3.105576 
70 Samin Textiles Ltd. –2.683712 
71 Sana Industries Ltd. –9.300274 
72 Sapphire Fibres Ltd. –8.95482 
73 Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd. –8.112624 
74 Sargodha Spinning Mills Ltd. –2.579557 
75 Saritow Spinning Mills Ltd. 5.391103 
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